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NIMBY'S LEGACY-
A CHALLENGE TO LOCAL AUTONOMY:
REGULATING THE SITING OF GROUP
HOMES IN NEW YORK
Anna L. Georgiou*
Introduction
Zoning is intended to control types of housing and living and
not the genetic or intimate internal family relations of human
beings.1
In 1993, the New York State Office of Mental Health ("OMH")
estimated a need for at least 20,000 new residential beds "to pro-
vide housing and support for adults with severe and persistent
mental illness."'2 And, in 1998, according to the New York State
Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities
("OMRDD"), there were approximately 6,700 people with devel-
opment disabilities whose need for residential placement had not
yet been met.3
It is well established that local governments may regulate land-
use within their jurisdictions.4 As a result of this authority, zoning
laws often reflect the traditional family values of the community
being regulated. For example, local concerns such as the preserva-
tion of neighborhood character, public safety, noise reduction and
the removal of nuisances have been deemed legitimate "public wel-
fare" interests.5 Nevertheless, when local governments adopt zon-
* J.D. Pace University School of Law, 1998. Associate, Jacobowitz and Gubits,
LLP. The author would like to thank Professor John R. Nolon, Director of the Pace
University School of Law's Land Use Center, for his contribution to this article.
1. See City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758
(1974).
2. See Future Housing Needs for Adults with Disabilities Living with their Fami-
lies, A Report to the Governor and to the Legislature, NYS OMH & OMRDD 2
(Apr. 1994). According to this study, the need for 20,000 new residential beds in-
cluded "4,300 beds to house current inpatients of NYS psychiatric centers as they
transition to community living, 10,600 beds for persons who are mentally ill and
homeless, and 5,100 beds for individuals now living in the community." Id.
3. See N.Y. Cares (last modified Aug. 19, 1998) <http://www.omr.state.ny.us/ny-
cares.htm>.
4. See Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct. 81 (1996).
5. See Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d at 305.
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ing laws in order to exclude or discourage "undesirable groups or
individuals" from residing in the community, the laws are suscepti-
ble to challenge on the ground that they are discriminatory.6
Group homes represent a non-traditional alternative to "single
family" living.7 Typically, group home residents are unrelated indi-
viduals, who, under supervision, share a single family home with a
common kitchen, sanitary facilities and other common living facili-
ties. When discussed throughout the body of this Comment, the
term "group home" will encompass both licensed and unlicensed
homes, as well as community residences for recovering substance
abusers, the mentally and physically disabled, special needs popu-
lations such as pregnant/parenting teens, victims of domestic vio-
lence and. supervised foster homes. Other non-traditional
households seeking to create a more affordable housing alternative
through home sharing, such as shared housing arrangements for
the elderly, will also be characterized as group homes. However,
institutional-like facilities such as shelters, transitional housing, sin-
gle-room occupancy hotels and facilities that include more than
fourteen residents will be specifically excluded.
The advent of the group home as an important congregate hous-
ing resource has taken place over the past three decades for a
number of reasons. First, there has been and remains a severe
shortage in affordable housing, particularly for newly employed
young adults and the elderly. Second, public policy calls for the
deinstitutionalization of the developmentally disabled and men-
tally ill. Finally, there is a growing need for congregate type living
arrangements for other special needs populations.8
Part I of this article will provide the framework for local zoning
authority in New York State and will also explore the methods by
which municipalities regulate the siting of group homes. Part II
will provide an overview of relevant New York State Constitu-
tional provisions and statutes, as interpreted by the courts, which
6. See U.S. v. City of Black Jack, Missouri, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
7. See Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d at 306 ("Indeed the purpose of the group home is to
be quite the contrary of an institution and to be a home like other homes.").
8. See generally TERRY RICE, WHAT IS A FAMILY FOR ZONING PURPOSES (1986).
In August 1998 Governor George Pataki announced a five year plan to create an
additional 4,900 new residential beds for the developmentally disabled to meet an
increased need. See OMRDD, Governor Announces "NY Cares" to Reduce Housing
Waiting List (Aug. 19, 1998) <http://www.omr.state.ny.us/nycares.htm>. Furthermore,
the New York State Legislature has identified a growing need for alternative housing
resources for the mentally ill and developmentally disabled who are currently living
with their aging parents. See 1993 N.Y. Laws 230, § 1.
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prevent the exclusion of group homes from communities. Part II
will also discuss the preemptory effect and limitations of the
Padavan Law in the siting of certain group homes. Part III will
examine the impact of federal laws on the siting of group homes,
particularly in the context of discrimination against the disabled.
The Federal Fair Housing Act, the Rehabilitation Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act are examples of federal laws that
will be analyzed. Part IV provides a summary analysis of the effect
of federal and state legislation on local land-use regulation pertain-
ing to group homes. This article concludes that despite the contin-
uing notion of "Not In My Back Yard" [hereinafter NIMBY],
group home advocates have begun to build a solid legal foundation
in challenging discriminatory zoning laws and practices that result
in the exclusion of group homes from communities.
I. A Framework to "Group Homes" and
the Concept of NIMBY
The concept of the community residence group home arose as a
result of the deinstitutionalization movement in the 1970s.9 Conse-
quently, The Willowbrook Consent Decree10 propagated the estab-
lishment of community residences with the intent of offering more
personalized services to the mentally disabled in a non-institu-
tional, homelike setting at a lower cost to the taxpayer than institu-
9. During the first half of this century, due toa policy of institutionalization, New
York State constructed over fifty large institutions for care and treatment of the men-
tally disabled. See Paul F. Stavis, Historical Repetition and Conceptual Constancy in
the Development of Mental Hygiene Law, 34 QUALrrY OF CARE (Jan./Feb. 1988)
<http://www.cqc.state.ny.us/cc34.htm>. The policy of institutionalization became dis-
favored in 1972 when appalling conditions were uncovered at New York's largest in-
stitution for care of the developmentally disabled, the Willowbrook Developmental
Center. The ensuing public outcry for reform and subsequent litigation against the-
State played a major role in disfavoring institutionalization. See Paul F. Starvis, The
Willowbrook Litigation After Fifteen Years: One Step Closer to Finality, 30 QUALITY
OF CARE (Mar./Apr. 1987) <http://www.cqc.state.ny.us/cc30.htm>.
10. See Paul F. Starvis, The Willowbrook Litigation After Fifteen Years: One Step
Closer to Finality, 30 QUALITY OF CARE (Mar./Apr. 1987) <http://www.cqc.state.ny.
us/cc30.htm> (last visited Dec. 9, 1998). In 1972, the N.Y. Civil Liberties Union and
others filed a class action in U.S. Federal District Court against New York State alleg-
ing civil rights of the developmentally disabled housed at the State's Willowbrook
Developmental Center had been violated. As a result, the Court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction forcing the state to immediately ameliorate conditions to at least meet
the then existing federal standards for care and treatment. The Willowbrook Consent
Judgment of 1975 set forth the framework for reform and in effect served as the impe-
tus for the policy of deinstitutionalization. Furthermore, a Stipulation and Order
signed in 1987 mandated that the Staten Island Developmental Center (formerly Wil-
lowbrook Developmental Center) would close by the end of 1987. See id.
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tional care. Congregate style community-based care became a
preferable alternative for many mentally disabled individuals." As
a result, New York State adopted a long-term policy favoring dein-
stitutionalization and the development of a network of community-
based services.
The policy of deinstitutionalization was met with local opposi-
tion concerning the siting of group homes in communities.1 2 Many
communities adhered to the belief that all group homes were in-
herently dangerous, and if a group home was situated in a neigh-
borhood, a decline in property value would inevitably result. This
pervasive attitude is commonly known as NIMBY.
A. Siting Group Homes Under Municipal Regulations
As local political pressure mounted and methods for local land-
use control grew more sophisticated, local governments responded
by adopting zoning laws which regulated uses within residential
zoning districts. For example, these laws defined the term "family"
more narrowly in order to restrict allowable uses within "single
family" districts. In defining "family," communities often imposed
traditional values. For instance, "single family" occupancy was re-
stricted to related individuals. Consequently, these zoning restric-
tions effectively excluded group homes from these communities
while the need for such homes continued to grow.
As a result of this increasing need, the New York State legisla-
ture began to pass laws that facilitated the siting and development
of group homes.13 The ever-increasing environment of public
awareness, and the ensuing enactment and enforcement of federal
and state anti-discrimination laws, provided fertile ground for chal-
lenge to restrictive zoning laws. However, these developments cre-
ated a tension between the autonomy of local authorities and the
new mandate to provide community-based care, making confronta-
tions unavoidable.
B. Local Police Powers and the Authority to Regulate
Under New York State law, local governments have the author-
ity to regulate many aspects of land-use within their respective ju-
11. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
12. See D. & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 177-82 (1984).
13. See infra Part II Section C and accompanying notes. The Padavan Law, dis-
cussed in the aforementioned section, is an example of a state law that facilitates the
placement of group homes.
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risdictions. 14 The New York State Constitution delegates to the
State Legislature the authority to enact legislation concerned with
the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of New York
State citizens.' 5 While this delegation of power includes the power
to enact and interpret zoning ordinances, the State Legislature has
further delegated this specific right to local governments by way of
enabling legislation. 16 A municipality's authority to regulate the
siting of group homes is derived from delegated police powers.
While it is well established that municipalities possess police
powers, it is also well established that a municipality may not ex-
ceed the powers granted to it by enabling legislation. Pursuant to
New York State Law, if a "municipality fails to enforce its zoning
laws, or acts arbitrarily or capriciously in varying the application of
the ordinance, and a person is thereby aggrieved," a decision by a
municipality may be subject to appeal. 17 Such an appeal, com-
monly referred to as an "Article 78" proceeding, is, in effect, a judi-
cial review procedure.' 8
There are a number of legal doctrines that may limit the author-
ity of local governments to enact and enforce zoning ordinances
and other land-use restrictions. Such doctrines include: (1) protec-
tions provided by the First Amendment; (2) protections provided
by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment; 19 (3) Fourteenth
Amendment protections such as substantive due process, proce-
14. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(2) (McKinney 1989); see also N.Y. TowN LAW
§ 262 (McKinney 1987); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-702 (McKinney 1996). New York
City has been credited with the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in the United
States, adopted in 1916. See Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313,
128 N.E. 209 (1920).
15. See N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
16. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (1)(ii)(a)(11), (12) (McKinney 1996)
(these provisions give municipalities the power to enact local laws for the "protection
and enhancement of [their] physical and visual environment," and for "protection,
order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein"); see also
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(2) (Consol. 1980); N.Y. TowN LAW § 262 (McKinney
1987); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-702 (McKinney 1996).
17. See Sun-Brite Car Wash, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals, 69 N.Y.2d 406,
412, 508 N.E.2d 130, 515 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1987).
18. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 (McKinney 1996). The standard of review under an
Article 78 proceeding is limited to whether the action was arbitrary and capricious, or
an abuse of discretion. See id. at § 7803(3). Therefore in any Article 78 proceeding
there is a strong presumption favoring the local regulatory authority. See Human
Development Services of Port Chester, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 67 N.Y.2d
702, 490 N.E.2d 846, 499 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1986).
19. See generally Daniel William Russo, Protecting Property Rights With Strict
Scrutiny: An Argument for the "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Standard, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 575 (1998).
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dural due process, and equal protection; (4) preemption by a state
statute or regulation; and (5) vesting rights limiting the enforce-
ment of "overly burdensome regulations. '20
Federal courts will also have appellate jurisdiction to review lo-
cal zoning ordinances or decisions made by zoning boards, "when
local decisions infringe national interests protected by statute or
the constitution."' 21 Moreover, acts of Congress may preempt state
and local police powers, if the Congressional intent and purpose to
preempt is clear. 2
When a municipality employs its delegated powers to regulate
for the benefit of public interest, however, this authority must not
be exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Furthermore, a
"legitimate public interest" and a "reasonable relation between the
end sought to be achieved by the regulation and the means used to
achieve that end" must exist.2 3
A municipality's police powers are extensive when applied to lo-
cal zoning authority. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,24
the Supreme Court held that legitimate public interests include
"public health, safety, morals or general welfare. '25 The Court rea-
soned that the exercise of zoning authority to segregate uses into
20. See Land-Use Law, Supplement II, Professor John Nolon, Spring 1997.
21. See Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 931 F. Supp. 222,
234 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 117 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1997); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI
(Supremacy Clause).
22. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (providing insight
into factors to be considered when evaluating whether federal preemption of local
police powers is warranted). The Court stated:
[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress. Such a purpose may be evidenced in several
ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
.reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supple-
ment it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal inter-
est is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject. [Or] the object sought to be
obtained by the federal law and the character of [the] obligations imposed
by it may reveal the same purpose. Or the state policy may produce a result
inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.
Id. at 230 (citations omitted); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
517 (1992) ("Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a
statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.").
23. See Genesis of Mount Vernon v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 152 Misc. 2d 997,
1000, 579 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (1991), affd, 179 A.D.2d 644, 579 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dept.
1991), affd in part, 81 N.Y.2d 741, 609 N.E.2d 122, 593 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1992).
24. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
25. See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
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various zoning districts, namely residential, commercial or indus-
trial, is valid.
Moreover, the segregation of the intensity of certain uses (i.e.,
single family zoning districts which exclude higher density uses
such as multifamily housing or apartment houses) continues to be
upheld as a valid use of local police powers. As a result, local zon-
ing powers may be legitimately used to protect the character of
single family neighborhoods, thereby limiting the use of homes in
single family residential districts to single families. As stated by
Justice Douglas in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,26 "[t]he police
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth val-
ues, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the
area a sanctuary for people.
27
C. How Municipalities Regulate the Siting of Group Homes
In direct contrast to the well-established local power to zone and
segregate uses, the means by which local governments implement
these powers may be subject to challenge. For example, a local
government might craft a zoning ordinance to include a definition
of family which carefully mirrors the locality's perception of a sin-
gle family use or neighborhood. Typically, such regulations have
required a blood or legal familial relationship among those residing
in a single family home. As such, group homes that functioned as
single family homes, but included a number of unrelated individu-
als, would not satisfy the definition and were thus excluded from
single family zones.
Local governments often regulate the siting of group homes in
three ways: (1) by permitting principal uses in one or more zoning
districts (this typically occurs when a group home complies with a
zoning code's definition of "family"); (2) by allowing siting upon
the attainment of a special permit;28 or (3) in the face of a use ex-
pressly or impliedly not permitted, the municipality requires a use
26. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
27. Id. at 9.
28. See generally N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-725-b, N.Y. TowN LAw § 274-b, N.Y.
GEN. CITY LAw § 27-b. A special permit use, in contrast to a variance, is a permitted
use, subject to conditions stipulated in the zoning ordinance. Often times a zoning
ordinance will include both specific (to a particular special use) and general (pertain-
ing to all special uses) conditions to be complied with prior to special permit approval
by the designated local government entity.
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variance. 29 For the purposes of this analysis, the approach adopted
by two Westchester County municipalities will be described and
contrasted.
1. Definition of Family
The Zoning Code of the City of Mount Vernon defines family as
"[o]ne (1) or more persons having a common domestic bond who
live together in one (1) dwelling unit as a traditional family or its
functional equivalent, headed by one (1) or more resident persons
who have the authority over the care, functioning or management
of their common household. ' 30 The Zoning Code describes a
"dwelling unit" as "[a] building or portion thereof providing com-
plete housekeeping facilities for one (1) family, including in-
dependent cooking, sanitary and sleeping facilities."' 31 Single-
family dwellings are considered to have met the principal use re-
quirements in all residential zoning districts. Accordingly, if a
group home is rendered the functional equivalent of a traditional
family, it will be allowed as a principal permitted use in every resi-
dential zoning district.
In contrast, the Town of Ossining's Zoning Code defines family
as "[o]ne (1) or more persons occupying a dwelling unit as a single
nonprofit housekeeping unit. More than five (5) persons, exclusive
of domestic servants, not related by blood, marriage or adoption,
shall not be considered to constitute a family. ' 32 The vast majority
of the Town's zoning districts are one-family residential districts of
varying density, with permitted uses restricted to "[o]ne-family de-
tached dwellings, not to exceed one (1) dwelling on each lot. 33
The Zoning Code definition of "dwelling unit" is "[a] building, or
entirely self-contained portion thereof, containing complete house-
29. The standards to be used for granting a use variance are defined in the laws of
New York State. See N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(2), N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(2),
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-b(3). The following standards must be met to prove the
zoning regulations have caused an "unnecessary hardship": (1) the owner cannot real-
ize a reasonable return; (2) the hardship is unique to the owner's property and not
applicable to a substantial portion of the zoning district; (3) granting of the variance
will not alter the essential character of the neighborhood; and (4) the hardship is not
self-created. The Zoning Board of Appeals must grant the minimum variance
necessary.
30. CITY OF MOUNT VERNON ZONING CODE § 267-2.3 (1997). The prior code def-
inition of family was as follows: "One (1) or more persons related by blood, marriage
or legal adoption who live together in (one) dwelling unit and maintain a common
household." See id.
31. See id.
32. ToWN OF OSSINING ZONING CODE § 200-53 (1985).
33. See id.
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keeping facilities for only one (1) family .... 34 Therefore, a group
home consisting of six unrelated individuals would effectively be
excluded as a permitted use.
2. Special Permit
The City of Mount Vernon permits "domiciliary care facilities"
as a special permitted use in most residential zoning districts. A
"domiciliary care facility" encompasses "[a] private proprietary
nursing home, convalescent home, or home for adults; a home for
the aged, a group residence or other residential care facility for
adults as defined in the New York Social Services Law or regula-
tions promulgated thereunder, and any similar facilities operated
under the supervision of federal departments and agencies. '35 In
this respect, group homes which do not meet the Zoning Code's
"traditional family standard" may be granted a special permit.
However, in order to be approved by the Planning Board as a spe-
cially permitted use, general and specific conditions must first be
met.36
Procedurally, an applicant for a special permit in the City of
Mount Vernon must comply with the following Zoning Code re-
quirements: (1) the applicant must submit a preliminary applica-
tion to the Department of Buildings; (2) a public hearing must be
held on the application within sixty-two days of the date the com-
pleted application is received; (3) the City must publish notice of
the hearing in the official newspaper; and (4) the applicant must
notify all property owners within two hundred fifty feet of the pro-
posed site: (i) of the hearing, (ii) the substance of the application,
34. See id.
35. See Mour VERNON ZONING CODE §§ 267-6.4, 267-6.5B.
36. See id. The Code's general conditions are as follows:
(1) [t]he location and the size of the special permit use, the nature and inten-
sity of the operations involved in or conducted in connection with it, the size
of the site in relation to it and the location of the site with respect to streets
giving access to it, are such that it will be in harmony with the appropriate
and orderly development of the area in which it is located; (2) the location,
nature and height of buildings, walls and fences and the nature and extent of
existing or proposed plantings on the site are such that the special permit use
will not hinder or discourage the appropriate development and use of adja-
cent land and buildings; (3) operations in connection with any special permit
use will not be more objectionable to nearby properties by reason of noise,
traffic, fumes, vibration or other such characteristics than would be the oper-
ations of permitted uses not requiring a special permit.
Id. The Code's specific condition for "Domiciliary Care Facilities" includes the fol-
lowing prohibition: "[n]o office of a professional person shall be permitted except for
the treatment of residents of the facility itself." See id.
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and (iii) submit an affidavit to the City attesting to the fact that
such notification was made.37
3. Use Variance
The Town of Ossining fails to include any special permitting pro-
vision for group homes or related congregate facilities.38 Accord-
ingly, in consideration of the Town Zoning Code's narrow
definition of family and lack of a special permitted use provision, a
use variance would be required for the siting of a group home con-
sisting of greater than five residents.3 9
II. State Laws Impacting the Siting and
Development of Group Homes
A. The New York State Constitution
New York municipalities, as well as municipalities throughout
the nation, have attempted to preserve the character of single fam-
ily zoning districts by narrowly defining the allowable residential
use in these districts. For example, in City of White Plains v. Ferrai-
oli,40 the New York Court of Appeals held that a zoning ordinance
which required that a "family" consist of genetically or legally re-
lated individuals was too restrictive.4' It was in this respect that the
court ultimately found that the Ferraioli family, which consisted of
an adult couple, their two children and ten foster children, was in-
deed the functional equivalent of a family. 2
In McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay,43 the zoning ordinance being
challenged restricted the definition of family to "any number of
persons related by blood, marriage, or legal adoption, living and
37. See id. § 267-6.3.
38. In most residential districts, the following is included as a use permitted by
special permit: "[s]chools and educational institutions, philanthropic, eleemonsynary
or religious institutions, hospitals, nursing and rest homes or sanitaria for general
medical care and treatment of the mentally ill, but excluding facilities for the perma-
nent confinement of the mentally ill, drug addicts and chronic alcoholics." TowN OF
OSSININ c ZONING CODE § 200-7(B)(2).
39. See id. at § 200-46. Procedurally, pursuant to the Town of Ossining Zoning
Code, an applicant for a use variance is subject to notice and hearing requirements,
similar to the provisions of the Mount Vernon ordinance. See id.
40. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756 (1974).
41. See Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d at 303. The White Plains zoning ordinance defined
family as "one or more persons limited to the spouse, parents, grandparents,
grandchildren, sons, daughters, brothers or sisters of the owner or the tenant or of the
owner's spouse or tenant's spouse living together as a single housekeeping unit with
kitchen facilities." Id. at 304.
42. See id. at 303.
43. 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985).
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cooking on the premises together as a single, non-profit house-
keeping unit" or "[a]ny two (2) persons not related by blood, mar-
riage or legal adoption, living and cooking on the premises
together as a single, nonprofit housekeeping unit, both of whom
are sixty-two (62) years of age or over, and residing on the prem-
ises."'44 Upon review, the New York Court of Appeals held that a
zoning ordinance restricting the occupancy of single family homes
based on biological or legal relationships had no reasonable rela-
tionship to a municipality's legitimate zoning purposes and thus vi-
olated the due process clause of the New York State Constitution.45
As a result of McMinn, legitimate zoning ordinances that effec-
tively limit the number of unrelated persons living together in a
single family zone, but do not similarly restrict the number of re-
lated persons, are unconstitutional pursuant to the New York State
Constitution.46
In recent years, the McMinn standard has been expanded by the
Appellate Division. For example, in Children's Village v. Hol-
brook,47 the Third Department held that the definition of family, as
set forth in a town zoning ordinance, violated the State Due Pro-
cess Clause, notwithstanding the fact that the same zoning ordi-
nance included a provision specially permitting group homes in
single family residential zoning districts.48 The court noted that of
particular importance was the fact that the conditions for special
permits failed to distinguish between family style group homes and
institutional group homes. Accordingly, the Third Department
ruled that "without a constitutionally valid definition of family in
the zoning ordinance, its specific regulation of group homes is also
objectionable in that it may be applied to 'exclude [from the class
of occupancies not requiring a special permit] households that due
process requires be included."' 4 9
44. See id. at 547-48.
45. See id. at 549, 552. According to the Court, "[m]anifestly, restricting occu-
pancy of single family housing based on the biological or legal relationships between
its inhabitants bears no reasonable relationship to the goals of reducing parking and
traffic problems, controlling population density and preventing noise and distur-
bance." Id. at 549.
46. See Baer v. Town of Brookhaven, 73 N.Y.2d 942, 943, 537 N.E.2d 619 (1989).
47. 171 A.D.2d 298, 576 N.Y.S.2d 405 (3d Dept. 1991).
48. See id. at 407. The Town of Clarkstown's zoning ordinance defined family as
"any number of individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption [or not more than
five (5) individuals who are not so related], living together as a single housekeeping
unit." Id. at 406.
49. Id. at 407 (citing McMinn, 66 N.Y.2d at 550).
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In 1994, the Second Department affirmed a supreme court judg-
ment that a zoning ordinance, which included a rebuttable pre-
sumption that four or more unrelated persons living in a single
dwelling did not constitute the functional equivalent of a tradi-
tional family, was valid. ° The court reasoned:
because the provisions in question place no restriction on the
size of a group of people living together as the functional
equivalent of a traditional family, there is a rational relationship
between the end sought to be achieved ... the preservation of
the character of residential neighborhoods and the means used
to achieve that end ... the rebuttable presumption.5'
Although the rebuttable presumption was in effect a variance pro-
vision, the court held that there was fair opportunity for a party to
show that a proposed group home was indeed a functional
equivalent to a single family home. As such, the court concluded
that there was no violation of the State Constitution's Due Process
Clause.52
B. State Statutes
State statutes may preempt local zoning regulations if the state
has either an implied or explicit intent to preempt, or if a local law
is inconsistent with a general state law. 3 Section 41.34 of the
Mental Hygiene Law, also known as the Padavan Law, provides
that licensed community residences and family care homes for the
mentally disabled are deemed a family unit for purposes of local
land-use regulation.54 The Padavan Law also sets forth dispersion
50. See Unification Theological Seminary v. City of Poughkeepsie, 201 A.D.2d
484, 607 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1994).
51. Id. at 485. The City's zoning ordinance provided for "broad criteria" to rebut
the presumption "including whether the group shares the entire house, lives and
cooks together as a single housekeeping unit, shares expenses for food, rent, utilities,
or other household expenses, and is permanent and stable." Id.
52. See id.
53. See Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 546
N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S. 627 (1989); New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New
York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987), affid, 487 U.S. 1
.(1988).
54. The family care program consists of individuals who provide a home to men-
tally disabled persons in private homes. The community residence program assists the
mentally disabled who can benefit from a structured program "geared toward the
development or rehabilitation of skills that are necessary for successful reintegration
into the community." 1985 N.Y. Laws 351, § 33.
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guidelines and notification guidelines for the siting of licensed com-
munity residences.5 m
In addition, the New York Court of Appeals has held that the
operation of an unsecured detention home, established pursuant to
County Law Section 218-a, is exempt from local zoning regulation.
For example, in People v. St. Agatha Home for Children,56 the
Town of Pound Ridge charged a private child-care organization
with violating its zoning regulation for a single-family zoning dis-
trict. The court, however, held that Westchester County was au-
thorized and required to provide non-secure detention facilities
pursuant to County Law § 218-b.57 Although the county fulfilled
its obligation through the vehicle of privately owned homes, the
court reasoned that such an arrangement could remain valid on
three distinct grounds: (1) the facility was established by request of
the county; (2) the location was approved by the county; and (3)
the facility was funded by the county. 8
The state laws regulating residential substance abuse facilities, in
contrast to the Padavan Law and County Law Section 218-a, have
not been held to preempt local zoning regulation. In Incorporated
Village of Nyack v. Daytop Village, Inc.," the court of appeals
stated that although Article 19 of the Mental Hygiene Law
represented:
[A] sweeping effort to address the myriad of problems that have
flowed from the scourge of substance abuse in this State ...
[n]one of this, though, leads inexorably to the conclusion that
the State's commitment to fighting substance abuse preempts all
local laws that may have an impact, however tangential, upon
the siting of substance abuse facilities.6"
55. See infra Part C of this Section for a detailed discussion concerning the
Padavan Law.
56. 47 N.Y.2d 46, 389 N.E.2d 1098, 416 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1979).
57. See id. at 49; see also N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 218-a(B) stating in relevant part:
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, each board of supervisors shall
provide or assure the availability of conveniently accessible and adequate
non-secure detention facilities, certified for the state division for youth, as
resources for the family court in the county... to be operated in compliance
with the regulations of the division for youth fori the temporary care and
maintenance of alleged and adjudicated juvenile delinquents and persons in
need of supervision held for or at the direction of a family court.
Id.
58. See St. Agatha, 47 N.Y.2d at 49.
59. 78 N.Y.2d 500, 583 N.E.2d 928, 577 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1991).
60. Id. at 506.
1999]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
The court expressly distinguished Article 19 from Padavan, stating
that Padavan expressly withdrew the zoning authority of local gov-
ernments and further found that there was no implied preemption
evident from the wording of Article 19, its legislative intent or
promulgated regulations. The court left open the possibility, how-
ever, that municipal zoning regulations that effectively "block[ed]
the placement of substance abuse facilities within its borders"
might warrant a finding of preemption.6'
The courts have also been reluctant to preempt local zoning reg-
ulations pertaining to the siting of group homes for foster care. In
Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Ap-
peals of Town of North Hempstead,62 for instance, the court of ap-
peals held that a town may not use its zoning regulation's definition
of family to exclude a small group home for foster care of children.
The court was careful, however, to narrow its holding by stating
that, "[w]e need not, and accordingly we do not reach the broader
question whether the State has pre-empted this area to the extent
that a municipality may not forbid the establishment of a group
home authorized under State law."63 Despite such reluctance,
however, this area of the law will undoubtably continue to evolve
absent a clear legislative mandate.64
C. The Padavan Law
In New York State, the Padavan Law65 has preempted local zon-
ing authority in the siting of licensed community residential facili-
ties for the mentally disabled.66 The Padavan Law provides for
local input into the siting of certain licensed group homes. The un-
61. See id. at 508.
62. 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d 207, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978).
63. Id. at 271; see also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374-c (McKinney 1997). This provi-
sion of the Social Services law empowers authorized agencies to operate group homes
for children in compliance with departmental regulations. Section 374-c (2)(a) sets
forth a local notification procedure as follows: "If an authorized agency plans to es-
tablish one or more group homes within a municipality, it shall notify the chief execu-
tive officer of the municipality in writing of its intentions and include in such notice a
description of the nature, size and the community support requirements of this pro-
gram." Id.
64. See People v. Town of Clarkstown, 160 A.D.2d 17, 559 N.Y.S.2d 736 (2d Dept.
1990) (holding that provisions of a town zoning ordinance regulating family day-care
homes were preempted by N.Y. Social Services Law §§ 390, 410-d).
65. See N.Y. MENTAL Hyc. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney 1996).
66. See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney 1996); see also
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(f) ("A community residence established pursuant to
this section and family care homes shall be deemed a family unit for the purposes of
local laws and ordinances.").
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derlying purpose of the law is to promote and encourage the place-
ment of mentally disabled individuals in community settings in
order to provide the "least restrictive environment that is consis-
tent with [the needs of such individuals]." 67 The statute includes a
community notice requirement, in which the project sponsor for-
mally identifies the proposed site, the type of community residence
and the anticipated number of residents, and notifies the chief ex-
ecutive officer of the municipality of this information.68 The mu-
nicipality, in turn, has a forty day response period to analyze the
proposal and to approve the site, suggest one or more suitable
sites, or reject the siting of a facility within the municipality be-
cause of an over-concentration of such facilities.69
It should be noted that the Padavan Law and its mandated ap-
proval process applies only to community residences licensed by
the New York State Office of Mental Health or the Office of
Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, with a pro-
posed occupancy of four to fourteen residents. 70 Therefore, an un-
licensed facility could not avail itself of Padavan's siting and
dispersion guidelines.71
The essential element of Padavan is mandated, but flexible, dis-
persion guidelines.72 After receiving notice, a municipality may ap-
prove the recommended site, suggest alternative sites or object to
the establishment of a facility because of over-concentration. If a
municipality claims saturation or over-concentration, the critical
67. See 1978 N.Y. Laws 468.
It is the intention of this legislation to meet the needs of the mentally dis-
abled in New York State by providing, whenever possible, that such persons
remain in normal community settings .... It is further intended that com-
munication and cooperation between the various state agencies, local agen-
cies, and local communities be fostered by this legislation, and that this will
be best achieved by establishment of clearly defined procedures for the se-
lection of locations for community residences, to best protect the interests of
the mentally disabled and ensure acceptance of community residences by
local communities.
Id.
68. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1) (McKinney 1996).
69. See id.
70. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(1) (This provision includes the defini-
tion for "community residential facility for the disabled.").
71. See Jennings v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 90 N.Y.2d 227, 243,
682 N.E.2d 953, 960, 600 N.Y.S.2d 352, 359 (1997) (Judge Smith stated that unli-
censed facilities are not relevant to Padavan's over-concentration analysis and "[s]uch
a sweeping position is not the one adopted by the Legislature and the Commissioner's
conclusions in this regard are rational.").
72. The Padavan Law has been upheld by the State Court of Appeals. See Jen-
nings, 90 N.Y.2d at 227.
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concern becomes whether the nature and character of the area in
which the facility is to be based would be substantially altered as a
result of establishment of the facility. Over-concentration is deter-
mined by identifying the number of similar facilities (e.g., licensed
community residences, residential care facilities and facilities pro-
viding residential services to former in-patients) located in the area
of the proposed siting or located within the municipality.73 These
dispersion guidelines are absolute and must be applied to alterna-
tive sites recommended by a municipality prior to approval by
either the Commissioner of Mental Health or by the Commissioner
of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities. 4
Padavan's dispersion guidelines have paved the way for an effi-
cient and effective siting process. In fact, the law has been so suc-
cessful that no municipality has ever prevailed on a challenge of a
proposed siting based on over-concentration, despite the fact that
municipalities have raised concerns that proposed sitings would im-
pact the character of a neighborhood.75 Such concerns, including
safety and traffic, have been found to be without effect unless there
73. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 463-a (McKinney 1997) (The Department of So-
cial Services is responsible for providing to the governor on an annual basis "a regis-
try of all community residences presently operating in [the] state including the types
of services provided, the number of persons served, the number of persons authorized
to reside therein, the licensing authority by which it is governed and the municipality
in which it is located.").
74. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney 1997). The New York
Mental Hygiene Law sets forth the procedures for reviewing facility siting by the
sponsoring state agency. See id. If the municipality and the sponsoring agency cannot
reach agreement as to the siting of a facility, "either the sponsoring agency or the
municipality may request an immediate hearing before the commissioner [of the
sponsoring agency] to resolve the issue." Id. The Commissioner or a designated
hearing officer must conduct a hearing within fifteen days of a request. See id.
In reviewing any such objections, the need for such facilities in the munici-
pality shall be considered as shall the existing concentration of such facilities
and other similar facilities licensed by other state agencies in the municipal-
ity or in the area in proximity to the site selected and any other facilities in
the municipality or in the area in proximity to the site selected providing
residential services to a significantnumber of persons who have formerly re-
ceived in-patient mental health services in facilities of the office of mental
health or the office of mental retardation and developmental disabilities.
The commissioner shall sustain the objection if he determines that the nature
and character of the area in which the facility is to be based would be sub-
stantially altered as a result of establishment of the facility. The commis-
sioner shall make a determination within thirty days of the hearing.
Id.
75. See Kevin J. Zanner, Dispersion Requirements for the Siting of Group Homes:
Reconciling New York's Padavan Law with the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
44 BuFF. L. REV. 249, 258 (1996).
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is an over-concentration of similar facilities and the nature and
character of a neighborhood will be substantially altered.76
In Jennings v. New York State Office of Mental Health,77 the
court of appeals dismissed an Article 78 petition and interpreted
the facility siting criteria of the Padavan law. 78 A community resi-
dence, to be licensed by the New York State Office of Mental
Health, was proposed to be sited in an Albany neighborhood.7 9
Applying a hybrid, arbitrary and capricious standard of review,
Judge Smith stated, "while over-concentration is certainly relevant,
whether the nature and character of an area will be substantially
altered by the establishment of the proposed facility is the disposi-
tive inquiry."80 The court cited support in the fact that the neigh-
borhood boundaries were defined by the City's own witnesses and
"there [was] no indication that the larger area . . .would be any
more saturated than the smaller neighborhood. ' 81 Moreover, the
court affirmed both the hearing officer's and Commissioner's con-
clusion that testimony concerning a decrease in property values
was an irrelevant inquiry.82
The Padavan Law's purpose is to facilitate the establishment of
community residences and to place the disabled into the "life of the
76. See Town of Mount Pleasant v. New York Office of Mental Health, 200
A.D.2d 576, 606 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1994) (noting that the evidence offered by the munici-
pality, in showing that the character of an area would be substantially altered, must be
clear and of a convincing nature).
77. 220 A.D.2d 148, 644 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1996), rev'd, 90 N.Y.2d 227 (1997).
78. See id. at 151-52, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 846-47 (1996), rev'd, 90 N.Y.2d 227 (1997).
The Court of Appeals rejected the Appellate Division's determination that the pres-
ence of residential facilities in an area adjacent to the neighborhood as defined was
relevant. See id. In its analysis the Appellate Division interpreted this provision of
Padavan and stated, "[i]n this unique situation where there is a high concentration of
similar facilities that impact upon the subject area, we find that the Commissioner's
delineation of the neighborhood boundaries to exclude a number of other residential
facilities in close proximity to the site in question was arbitrary and capricious ... 
Id. at 150, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
79. See id. The Mayor of Albany objected to the site, and requested a hearing
without suggesting an alternative site for the facility. At the hearing, the State Office
of Mental Health provided evidence that there was a significant need for more resi-
dential non-institutional programs in Albany County. The City's witnesses argued
that: (1) there was an over-concentration of special needs housing (unlicensed and
licensed) in the Albany neighborhood; (2) property values had been adversely im-
pacted by these existing facilities; and (3) when conducting an over-concentration
analysis, facilities located in the area adjacent to the neighborhood should be in-
cluded. See id. at 150.
80. See Jennings, 90 N.Y.2d at 240-41 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 242.
82. See id. at 237.
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community."8 3 However, in consideration of recent federal court
decisions, including the Sixth Circuit's recent holding in Larkin v.
State of Michigan Department of Social Services,84 Padavan may be
subject to challenge as discriminatory pursuant to the Fair Housing
Act Amendments [hereinafter FHAA]. Unlike Padavan, the
Michigan Adult Foster Care Licensing Statute, challenged in
Larkin, included a mandatory notice requirement to all residences
located within 1,500 feet of the proposed facility, and prohibited
licensing if the proposed facility was located within 1,500 feet of a
similar institution." However, similar to Padavan, the purpose and
intent of the Michigan statute and the dispersion requirement was
to "integrate[ ] the disabled into the community" and "serve[ ] the
goal of deinstitutionalization by preventing a cluster of [Adult Fos-
ter Care] facilities from recreating an institutional environment in
the community. '86 In holding that the statute was preempted by
the FHAA, the Court stated "statutes that single out for regulation
group homes for the handicapped are facially discriminatory" and
that a "benign motive does not prevent the statute from being dis-
criminatory on its face." '87
Padavan's inherent flexibility is clearly distinguishable from the
Michigan statute's application of rigid dispersion and spacing
guidelines. Moreover, the recent court of appeals holding in Jen-
nings confirmed that over-concentration is not dispositive, but
merely a factor to consider when evaluating the impact of licensed
83. See id. at 241 (quoting Governor's Approval Memorandum, 1978 N.Y. Laws
1821).
84. 89 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 1996).
85. The Michigan Adult Foster Care, Licensing Act (M.C.L.) Section 400.716(3)
(1997) required the state licensing agency to comply with M.C.L. §§ 125.216(a),
125.286(a) and 125.583(b) (1997), which required it to give notice to the municipality
within which a proposed facility was to be located. The municipality then was re-
quired to give notice to all property owners of residences located within a 1,500 radius
of the proposed facility. See M.C.L. §§ 125.216(a), 125.286(a) and 125.583(b) (1997).
According to the statute, "[a] state licensing agency shall not license a proposed resi-
dential facility if another licensed residential facility exists within the 1,500-foot radius
of the proposed location, unlesspermitted by local zoning ordinances or if the issu-
ance of the license would substantially contribute to an excessive concentration of
state licensed residential facilities within the city or village." M.C.L. § 125.583(b)(4)
(1997).
86. See Larkin, 89 F.3d at 290 n.37.
87. See id. According to the Court a facially discriminatory statute will survive
challenge pursuant to the FHAA only if the statutes's provisions are "'warranted by
the unique and specific needs and abilities of those handicapped persons' to whom the
regulations apply." Id. The court held that both the Michigan statute's 1,500 foot
dispersion requirement and the notice requirement were preempted by the FHAA.
See id.
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community residences on a particular neighborhood. Although the
issue has not yet been addressed by state or federal courts, and
irrespective of the Sixth Circuit's holding in Larkin, Padavan
would likely survive a challenge under the FHAA.88
IIl. The Federal Fair Housing Act and Amendments
A. Legislative History
In 1968, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act in order to pro-
hibit housing discrimination on the basis of color, race, religion,
national origin, and gender. The FHAA extended protections to
the handicapped.8 9 It was the intent of Congress to protect against
housing discrimination by expanding its reach to discriminatory
practices of state and local governments. 9° A House of Represent-
atives Report defined the intent of the FHAA as follows:
While state and local governments have authority to protect
safety and health and to regulate use of land, that authority has
sometimes been used to restrict the ability of individuals with
handicaps to live in communities. This has been accomplished
by such means as the enactment of health, safety or land-use
requirements on congregate living arrangements among non-re-
lated persons with disabilities. Since these requirements are not
imposed on families and groups of similar size of other unre-
lated people, these requirements have the effect of discriminat-
ing against people with disabilities.9'
B. Proving a Prima Facie Case and Discrimination
According to Section 3604 of the FHAA, it is unlawful "[t]o dis-
criminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable, or
deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap
....92 This provision would extend to a current or potential resi-
88. See infra text accompanying notes 163-165.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). According to the FHAA, handicap includes: "(1) a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities; (2) a record of having such impairment; or (3) being regarded as
having such an impairment." Current illegal use of drugs or substance abuse is ex-
cluded from the definition of handicap. The protections of the FHAA also extend to
groups that provide housing for the handicapped. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b).
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 3615; see also H.R. REP. No. 711 (1988) ("Generalized percep-
tions about disabilities and unfounded speculations about threats to safety are specifi-
cally rejected as grounds to justify exclusion.").
91. See H.R. REP. No. 711 (1988).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).
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dent of a group home and to "any person associated with that
buyer or renter."93
There are three different methods of proving discrimination
under the FHAA: (1) discriminatory intent or discriminatory treat-
ment; (2) discriminatory effect; and (3) reasonable accommoda-
tion. To prove intentional discrimination, plaintiffs must show that
"discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor" in the decision
making process.94
The Second Circuit has adopted two tests to determine the pres-
ence of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.95 First, pursu-
ant to the "disparate impact" test, mere "discriminatory effect"
may present adequate proof of discrimination. 96 Second, under the
discriminatory treatment test, a plaintiff "need only show that the
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1); see also infra text accompanying notes 124-29 for a
discussion of Article III standing requirements.
94. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270 (1977). The Sixth Circuit has adopted a rigid standard for proof of
intentional discrimination under the FHAA. See Smith & Lee Associates v. City of
Taylor, 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996). The owner of an adult foster care home for the
elderly handicapped brought a claim against a Michigan municipality under the
FHAA. The plaintiff alleged intentional discrimination and a failure to make reason-
able accommodation to permit the operation of a twelve person home in a single
family residential district. See id. at 786. In modifying the holding of the District
Court, the Sixth Circuit held that there was insufficient proof of discriminatory ani-
mus by the City in its refusal to rezone the foster care home because: (1) the City's
zoning ordinance that restricted occupancy of unrelated individuals in single family
zones was adopted prior to the plaintiff's application; (2) the City's treatment of
"home businesses" as an accessory use was not relevant; and (3) statements of City
officials expressing concerns regarding property values and safety did not necessarily
provide proof of discriminatory purpose. See id. at 792-94. However, the court held
there was sufficient proof that the City of Taylor had not made a reasonable accom-
modation in violation of the FHAA. See id. at 795-96; see also Ass'n for Advance-
ment v. City of Elizabeth, 876 F. Supp. 614 (1994) (holding that a city ordinance
automatically denying a conditional use permit for higher occupancy community resi-
dences for the developmentally disabled, unless special siting and other conditions
were met to protect the community from a "risk of harm," was facially discriminatory
and violated the FHAA).
95. See Stewart B. McKinney Found. Inc. v. Town Planning and Zoning Commis-
sion, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1217 (D. Conn. 1992). "The Second Circuit has stated a dis-
parate impact analysis examines a facially-neutral policy or practice, such as a hiring
test or zoning law, for its differential impact or effect on a particular group, whereas a
disparate [differential] treatment analysis involves differential treatment of similarly
situated persons or groups." Id.
96. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.
1988), aftd, 488 U.S. 15 (1989); see also Stewart B. McKinney, 790 F. Supp. at 1211.
Although we agree that a showing of discriminatory intent is not required
under section 3604 (a) [Fair Housing Act], we refuse to conclude that every
action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal. Such a per se rule
would go beyond the intent of Congress and would lead courts into untena-
ble results in specific cases. Rather, the courts must use their discretion in
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plaintiff's disability was a "motivating factor" in the defendant's
decision. 97 Accordingly, to prove discrimination under the FHAA,
because discriminatory practices are often invidious and hidden,
specific intent to discriminate does not have to be proven by the
plaintiff.
A third test to establish proof of discrimination against the hand-
icapped is nonetheless expressly designated as a method of proof in
the FHAA and has been adopted by other circuits; however, the
test is rarely employed by the Second Circuit.98 Pursuant to the
Federal rights established under the FHAA, the test requires local
governments to "make reasonable accommodation in rules, poli-
cies, practices or services, when accommodations may be necessary
to afford such [handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling." 99 The analysis as to whether an accommodation
is required is a determination based upon the facts. 100
deciding whether, given the particular circumstances of each case, relief
should be granted under the statute.
Stewart B. McKinney, 790 F. Supp. at 1217. The plaintiff has the burden of establish-
ing a prima facie case under disparate impact analysis. See Huntington Branch,
NAACP, 844 F.2d at 933. The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove a legiti-
mate government interest in the regulation. See id. "In the end, the court must bal-
ance the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory impact against the defendant's justifica-
tions for its conduct." Oxford House v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1182
(E.D.N.Y. 1993).
97. See Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). This Court of Appeals case on remand from
the Supreme Court, delineated four factors to determine discriminatory impact under
the FHA: (1) the strength of the discriminatory effect, (2) evidence of discriminatory
intent, (3) the defendant's interests in the action, and (4) the nature of relief the plain-
tiff seeks. See id. at 1240. A differential treatment analysis includes inquiry into the
following: "(1) discriminatory impact; (2) the historical background of a decision; (3)
the sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision; (4) departures from
normal procedural sequences; and (5) departures from normal substantive criteria."
Stewart B. McKinney, 790 F. Supp. at 1211.
98. See Smith & Lee Assoc., 102 F.3d at 793-96; see also Stewart B. McKinney, 790
F. Supp. at 1222 (acknowledging that reasonable accommodation could provide the
basis for a separate claim of discrimination under the FHAA).
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
100. See Turning Point, Inc. v. City of Caldwell, 74 F.3d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing City of Edmonds v. Washington State Building Code Council, 18 F.3d 802
(9th Cir. 1994)). See also City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725 (1995);
Smith & Lee Assoc., 102 F.3d at 794-95. The court defined the key elements of 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) as follows: (1) "equal opportunity" as used in the FHAA "is
concerned with achieving equal results, not just formal equality;" (2) "necessary"
means "plaintiffs must show that, but for the accommodation, they likely will be de-
nied an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice;" and (3) the term
"reasonable" was intended by Congress to share the definition pursuant to Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act and as interpreted in Southeastern Community College
v. Davis to require an accommodation unless "it requires 'a fundamental alteration in
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Courts have been careful to limit the application of the FHAA
to give a protected class equal access to housing, but not preferred
access.' 0' Courts also have required reasonable accommodation by
local governments in zoning matters, pursuant to the FHAA. °2 In
Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis,103 the Eighth Circuit held that
zoning restrictions were not exempt from the FHAA. The Court
limited the application of the Fair Housing Act exemption provi-
sion, Section 3607 (b)(1), consonant with the Supreme Court's City
of Edmonds10 4 decision. 0 5 Therefore, the FHAA required "the
City to make reasonable accommodation in its generally applicable
zoning ordinances when necessary to give a handicapped person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." ''"6
In Pulcinella v. Ridley, °7 the district court noted "substantial
case law that holds or opines that local zoning laws and municipal
zoning decisions must make 'reasonable accommodation' for hand-
the nature of a program' or imposes 'undue financial and administrative burdens."'
Ultimately the local burden imposed by the accommodation must be balanced against
the needs of the handicapped class. See Smith & Lee Assoc., 102 F.3d at 794-95.
101. See Brandt v. Village of Chebanse, Illinois, 82 F.3d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1996).
The Brandt court stated: "it is unlikely that the Fair Housing Act was designed to
abolish single-family zoning for all developers who comply with the requirement that
first-floor apartments be accessible to handicapped tenants." Id. at 175; see also Turn-
ing Point, 74 F.3d at 945.
102. See Turning Point, 74 F.3d at 944; Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, Ohio, 974
F.2d 43, 45 (6th Cir. 1992); Horizon House Developmental Serv. Inc. v. Township of
Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 699 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d
Cir. 1993). But see Pulcinella v. Ridley Township, 822 F. Supp. 204, 209 (E.D. Pa.
1993).
103. 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1996).
104. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. et al., 514 U.S. 725 (1995) (holding
that zoning provisions governing area zoned for single-family dwelling units, which
defined family as persons related by genetics, adoption, marriage or group of five or
fewer unrelated persons, described who could compose a family unit, not the maxi-
mum number of occupants that the dwelling unit could house, and thus, did not fall
within the FHA's absolute exemption for total occupancy limits). See id.
105. See Oxford House-C, 77 F.3d at 251. ("The Supreme Court recently held
§ 3607(b)(1) only exempts total occupancy limits intended to prevent overcrowding in
living quarters, not ordinances like the City's that are designed to promote the family
character of a neighborhood") (citing City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 728; see also 42
U.S.C. § 3603(b), 3.2(b), 3604(f)(9) (1994) (The FHAA's other exemptions pertain to:
(1) the sale or rental of single family homes, if an owner owns no more than three
such homes; and (2) units in dwellings containing four or less individual families
where the owner resides in one of the units). In addition, the Act does not require
housing be made available to an individual posing a direct health or safety threat to
others, or "whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property
of others." See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (1994).
106. See Oxford House-C, 77 F.3d at 251 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (1994)).
107. 822 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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icapped persons. ' 1 °8 The court distinguished between "local zon-
ing ordinances that placed special requirements upon zoning
permits obtained by handicapped"'10 9 and "zoning decisions and
practices," 10 recognizing only the former as subject to the FHAA.
However, this narrow interpretation of the statute has not been
widely accepted and appears inconsistent with Congressional in-
tent. Congress clearly intended that the FHAA be applied to pro-
hibit zoning practices that have a discriminatory effect."'
Therefore, in this instance, Congress has concluded beyond infer-
ence that the expansive language of the FHAA is inclusive of local
governmental functions such as zoning.
C. Remedies. under the FHAA
The FHAA provides for two mechanisms of enforcement. A
civil action may be brought by an aggrieved party 12 within two
years after the alleged discrimination, and an administrative rem-
edy is available through the Department of Housing and Urban
Development with further enforcement by the U.S. Attorney
General." 3
IV. The Americans with Disabilities Act
A. Legislative History
The Americans With Disabilities Act [hereinafter ADA] was en-
acted in 1990 to help counter the historic discrimination exper-
ienced by the disabled." 4 There were a number of prior laws
which helped to provide its foundational basis, including the
108. Id. at 216.
109. Id. at 215.
110. Id.
111. See 134 CONG. REC. S122449 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1988) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy); 134 CONG. REC. H6491 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602. Pursuant to the statute, an aggrieved person is (1) any
person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2)
any person who believes such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing prac-
tice about to occur. See id.
113. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-14. If a state or local land-use law is being challenged,
the matter is referred to the Attorney General who may file an action in Federal
Court for mandamus and invalidation of the law, damages, court and attorney's fees,
and a civil penalty. An action involving challenge of a local land-use law must be filed
in Federal Court within eighteen months of the alleged discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 3610(g)(2)(c).
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1996) (stating, "historically, society has tended to
isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements,
such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a seri-
ous and pervasive problem").
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FHAA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.115 These enactments
prohibited discrimination against the disabled under specific cir-
cumstances and conditions, however none offered a comprehensive
approach to countering discrimination against the disabled.
The major purpose of the ADA was "to provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals.""16 It was also the intent of Congress to enact a
bill with broad coverage, so that persons with physical and mental
disabilities, as well as persons with health related disabilities, would
be protected from discrimination." 7 The ADA formally recog-
nized that the basis of discrimination experienced by the disabled
was politically and socially based, noting that such discrimination
could be more debilitating than the actual mental or physical hand-
icap itself.
Title II of the ADA follows the framework of the House of Rep-
resentatives' original bill and amendments, by setting specific stan-
dards for public entities in two subtitles, one which applies to
general prohibitions against discrimination known as Subtitle A',
and the other public transportation known as Subtitle B'."8
115. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1996). "No otherwise qualified individual with a disabil-
ity in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ..... Id. Title II
of the ADA significantly expanded rights under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended, to include services, programs and activities of local governments without
regard to Federal assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
116. See 134 CONG. REC. S5106, S5114 (1988) (statement of Senator Harkin). Sen-
ator Harkin, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped described
additional purposes of the Act as follows:
[T]o provide a prohibition of discrimination against persons with disabilities
parallel in scope of coverage with that afforded to persons on the basis of
race, sex, national origin, and religion.., to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standard addressing discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties ... [and] to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including our
power to enforce the 14th [a]mendment and to regulate commerce, in order
to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.
Id.
117. See 134 CONG. REC. S5106, S5115 (1988) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
The Senator described the broad coverage of the bill as follows:
It is based on the recognition by Congress and the courts that people have
many kinds of disabilities, from traditionally recognized conditions such as
blindness, cerebral palsy, and mental retardation to medical conditions such
as heart disease and diabetes. They are vulnerable to discrimination, and
they deserve protection. These protections are the basic civil rights of dis-
abled citizens, and they ought to be enforced.
Id.
118. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 19 (1990).
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One of the purposes of the ADA was to address the segregation
of the disabled, resulting from discriminatory practices. California
Congressman Ronald Dellums stated:
The history of different, separate, and unequal treatment of per-
sons with disabilities, especially those with severe disabilities,
could not be clearer. That history is in fact a stark reminder of
the prejudice and misunderstanding that has characterized the
treatment of minority citizens. This disparate treatment estab-
lishes an abundant factual predicate for the relief granted ....
The [ADA] is a plenary civil rights statute designed to halt all
practices that segregate persons with disabilities and those
which treat them inferior or differently. By enacting the ADA,
we are making a conscious decision to reverse a sad legacy of
segregation and degradation. 119
Title II, Subtitle A, was restructured during the evolution of the
ADA in Congress. In its final form, the Subtitle was described as
setting "forth the general anti-discrimination provision and other
relevant provisions for all public entities, which includes State and
local government, agencies and departments of a State .. 120
Thus, according to the congressional findings for the Act, "discrim-
ination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical
areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization,
health services, voting, and access to public services ....121
Title II of the legislation has two purposes. The first purpose is to make
applicable the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of disability,
currently set out in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, to all programs, activities, and services provided or made*
available by state and local governments or instrumentalities or agencies
thereto, regardless of whether or not such entities receive Federal financial
assistance. Currently, section 504 prohibits discrimination only by recipients
of Federal financial assistance.
The second purpose is to clarify the requirements of section 504 for public
transportation entities that receive Federal aid, and to extend coverage to all
public entities that provide public transportation, whether or not such enti-
ties receive Federal aid.
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 44 (1989).
119. 136 CONG. REC. H2599-01, H2639 (1990).
120. Id.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1996).
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B. Proving Discrimination Pursuant to Title II
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled
by public entities. 22 A public entity is defined in the statute, in
part, as "any state or local government" or instrumentality
thereof. 23 As such, this broad definition would seemingly apply to
virtually any instrumentality of a local, state or federal entity.
Generally, to bring a claim under Title II of the Act: (1) a plain-
tiff must be a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the individ-
ual must have been discriminated against by the public entity, or
excluded from participation in or denied the services, programs or
activities of a public entity specifically because of the disability; and
(3) the entity providing the activity, service, or program must be a
public entity. 124
In order to have standing to bring a claim under the ADA, a
plaintiff must satisfy both the constitutional 25 and prudential 26
limitations imposed by Article III. These Article III requirements
are satisfied if the plaintiff can allege: "(1) an 'injury in fact' (2)
fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct [and] (3) that a
favorable federal court decision likely would redress or remedy."1
27
Additionally, to fully address standing requirements, prudential
limitations apply.' 28 Courts have interpreted the ADA regulations
to grant a right of action to persons or entities who themselves are
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1996) ("Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such a disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."). Id.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1996) (In addition to "any local or state government," a
public entity is "any department, agency, special purpose district or other instrumen-
tality of a State or States or local government.").
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1996); see also Iyler v. City of Manhattan, 857 F. Supp.
800,' 817 (D. Kan. 1994). But see Cox v. Township of Upper St. Clair, No. Civ. A. 93-
1443, 1994 WL 902369 at *3 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that the ADA prohibits discrim-
ination by public entities limited only to their services, programs, and activities).
125. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
126. See Oak Ridge Care Center, Inc. v. Racine County, 896 F. Supp. 867, 871
(E.D. Wis. 1995).
127. Id.
128. See id. The court states: "Prudential limitations include the general prohibi-
tion on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication
of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the 'zone of in-
terests' protected by the law invoked." Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984) (discussing the standing doctrine in the context of school desegregation)).
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not disabled, but have been "discriminated against because of their
known association with disabled people. '129
Plaintiffs do not have to prove discriminatory intent under Title
II and some courts have held that proof of discriminatory effect is
sufficient. 30  For instance, in Crowder v. Kitagawa,'3  the Ninth
Circuit held that the discrimination prohibited by Title II includes
the "exclusion from benefits of public services, as well as discrimi-
nation by a public entity. 1 32 The court based its conclusion on
statutory construction and the legislative findings of the ADA. 33
The Crowder court held that a state's mandatory quarantine re-
quirement for animals, including guide dogs, discriminated against
visually impaired individuals by denying them "meaningful access"
to state services.' 34 Although the quarantine was defined as a pub-
lic health measure and not a service, program, or activity, the com-
plaint alleged discrimination by a public entity. As such, the
elements of the ADA were met.135 The court also analogized the
Supreme Court's past interpretation of discriminatory standards
under the Rehabilitation Act, which included "thoughtlessness, in-
difference or benign neglect," as well as intentional discrimination,
to the ADA. 136
129. See id. at 872 (discussing Tugg v. Towey, 864 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (S.D. Fla.
1994)); see also 28 C.F.R. § 3 5.130(g) (1996) ("A public entity shall not exclude or
otherwise deny equal services, programs or activities to an individual or entity be-
cause of the known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is
known to have a relationship or association.").
130. See Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing the
district court's summary judgment upholding a 120-day quarantine on importation of
animals to Hawaii because it unreasonably affected unusually impaired persons); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(5) (1996) (describing various forms of intentional and non-
intentional discrimination experienced by the disabled).
131. See Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1480 (reversing a district court's summary judgment).
132. See id. at 1483 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 12132).
133. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). "It is thus clear that Congress in-
tended the ADA to cover at least some so-called disparate impact cases of discrimina-
tion, for the barriers to full participation ... are almost all facially neutral but may
work to effectuate discrimination against disabled persons." Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1483.
134. See Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1482.
135. See id. at 1483; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1996).
136. See Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1484; see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287
(1985). The Supreme Court held that a pure discriminatory effect test for discrimina-
tion under the Rehabilitation Act would be overburdensome for the courts. Thus, as
a practical matter, proof of discrimination would include the denial of "meaningful
access" to services. See id.; see also Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832
n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The Legislative History of the ADA indicates that Congress
intended judicial interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act be incorporated by refer-
ence when interpreting the ADA.").
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The Third Circuit has since expanded this "meaningful access"
test to include "unnecessary segregation of individuals with disabil-
ities" as a factor for consideration.137 In Helen L. v. DiDario, for
example, the Third Circuit held that the rights of the disabled
plaintiff, under the ADA, were violated when the State of Penn-
sylvania required that she receive care in a nursing facility, instead
of her own home.138 The plaintiff qualified for a home attendant
care program, but for reasons of administrative efficiency, the State
rejected a home placement. 139 The court decided that "[t]he ADA
is intended to insure that qualified individuals receive services in a
manner consistent with basic human dignity rather than a manner
which shunts them aside, hides, and ignores them."14
According to Section 35.130(b)(7) of the Title II regulations,
promulgated by the Department of Justice, "[a] public entity shall
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures
when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on
the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that
making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
the service, program, or activity." Therefore, like the FHAA, a
failure by a municipality to provide a reasonable accommodation
or modification may be evidence of discrimination under Title II of
the ADA.
C. Innovative Health Systems v. City of White Plains-
Expanding the Reach of the ADA
The Second Circuit, in Innovative Health Systems v. City of White
Plains,141 has expanded the reach of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act by applying the statute to local zoning decisions.1 42 Plain-
tiff, Innovative Health Systems, Inc. ("IHS"), operated treatment
programs for alcoholics and substance abusers in the City of White
Plains. In January 1994, IHS leased the first floor of an apartment
building, located in downtown White Plains, in order to move its
treatment program to a more convenient and larger site. 43 As IHS
needed to renovate the leased space, it required a building permit,
137. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir. 1995).
138. See id. at 335-39.
139. See id. at 337-39.
140. See id. at 335 (footnote omitted).
141. 931 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 117 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1997).
142. See id.
143. See id. at 229. The program's initial location, inconvenient to the City's down-
town, was not easily accessible to clients, especially those relying on publc transporta-
tion and needing child care. See id.
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and since part of the building's first floor had been used as a store
(change of use), approval from the City's Planning Board was re-
quired.14 4 The Commissioner of Building referred the matter to
the City's Planning Board and included an opinion that an alcohol
and drug treatment program was a permitted use in a mixed-use
district. Because of considerable community opposition 145 and re-
sulting delays in the approval process, IHS withdrew its
application.146
IHS then applied for a building permit to renovate a section of
the leased premises that had been previously used as office space,
so that Planning Board approval would not be required. Again,
the Commissioner of Building deemed IHS' use to be an "office"
use and therefore "a permitted use," and the City's Corporation
Counsel concurred. 47  However, community opposition was
mounting, and the determination of the Commissioner of Buildings
was appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals. The Zoning Board
voted four-to-one to reverse the prior determinations of the Com-
missioner of Building that IHS' use would be a permitted use
under the City's zoning code.148
In a Memorandum and Order authorizing a preliminary injunc-
tion against the City, District Court Judge Parker held: (1) that the
ADA applies in the zoning context because zoning is an activity of
a public entity under Title II; (2) if the City received federal finan-
cial aid, the plaintiffs could also sustain a claim against one of the
City's instrumentalities for discrimination under the Rehabilitation
Act; (3) the plaintiffs had standing to sue; and (4) that the plaintiffs
met the test for a preliminary injunction by showing that there was
a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because there was
strong indication that the City and its instrumentalities allowed ille-
gal prejudices against a qualified disabled class to influence their
decision not to issue the building permit. 49 The Court agreed to
144. See id.
145. Community opposition included (1) members of the subject building's cooper-
ative association, (2) owners of local businesses and a nearby mall, and (3) members
of the community generally. Community concerns included: (1) the "condition and
appearance" of IHS' client base, (2) depressed market values of property, and (3) the
treatment program should be considered a "clinic," instead of an office use. See Inno-
vative Health Sys., 117 F.3d at 41.
146. See Innovative Health Sys., 931 F. Supp. at 229.
147. See id. at 229-30.
148. See id. at 230.
149. See id. at 244. The defendant, the City of White Plains, moved to dismiss on
the following points: (1) the City's zoning ordinance was not within the scope of the
ADA; (2) the Plaintiffs did not have standing to sue under the ADA; and (3) that
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provide the relief sought by the plaintiffs which included a prelimi-
nary injunction against the City of White Plains, ordering it to re-
frain from withholding the building permit for the out-patient
treatment program.
150
The district court held that the plaintiff would likely succeed on
the merits because of sufficient evidence of discriminatory motiva-
tion by the City.'5a The City's Zoning Board made its decision not
to issue the building permit and effectively reversed the prior opin-
ion of the Commissioner of Building, after a series of well attended
public hearings. Contrary to the opinion of the Commissioner of
Building and the City's Corporation Counsel, the Zoning Board
independently interpreted the proposed use by IHS as a clinic or
"hospital or sanitoria" use, an impermissible use in the City's high
density BR-4 zoning district. 52 In addition, the City permitted of-
fice use by several psychiatrists and social workers (offering com-
parable out-patient services to IHS) within the same zoning
district. In light of the foregoing, the district court concluded that
"the evidence supports plaintiffs' claim that defendants bowed to
political pressure exerted by certain members of the community"
and that the defendants were motivated by this pressure in their
decision making.15 3
In affirming the district court's order, the Second Circuit held
that Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act "clearly en-
compass zoning decisions by the City because making such deci-
sions is a normal function of a government entity.' 54 Consonant
with the district court's approach, the Second Circuit reiterated
that the statutory language of Title II clearly encompasses "all dis-
crimination by a public entity, regardless of the context," and that
the legislative history and applicable Department of Justice regula-
tions provide ample support to this approach. 155
"federal statutes do not accord preferential treatment to persons with disabilities."
See id.
150. See id. at 231.
151. See id. at 244.
152. See id. at 230.
153. See id. at 243.
154. See Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d at 44. Although not specifically addressed
by the Court, the implication is that Title II's provisions will also apply to the Plan-
ning Boards, Boards of Architectural Review and. other local agencies involved in
zoning matters and land-use decision making.
155. See id. at 45. Therefore, according to the Second Circuit, the protections of
the ADA, Title II extend to discrimination against the qualified disabled in local land-
use decision-making. See id. at 45-46.
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D. Remedies under Title II of the ADA
Administrative and judicial remedies are available to qualified
disabled individuals who believe they have been discriminated
against by a public entity. 156 A complaint may be filed within 180
days of the alleged discrimination, "with any agency that provides
funding to the public entity ... or with the Department of Justice
for referral."' 5 7 The Department of Justice also has included in its
regulations the use of "alternate means of dispute resolution, in-
cluding settlement, negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, media-
tion, fact finding, minitrials, and arbitration."'158 In such situations,
attorneys' fees may be awarded to the prevailing party in any ac-
tion or administrative proceeding. 59
Furthermore, the ADA also provides a private right of action. 160
A civil action may be brought by the Attorney General or any ag-
grieved person. 16 1 In addition to injunctive relief, the Supreme
Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools162
may signify the availability of compensatory and punitive damages
as a remedy under Title II of the ADA.
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994). The remedies under Title II include, all "reme-
dies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of Title 29 [the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, as amended]." Id.
157. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.170(a)-(c) (1998).
158. Id. § 35.176
159. See id. § 35.175
160. See Cousins v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 857 F.2d 37, 46, affd en banc, 880 F.2d
603 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that in addition to administrative remedies, there is a right
to private action under the Rehabilitation Act). Pursuant to the ADA enforcement
provisions, "the remedies, procedures, and rights" under the Rehabilitation Act are
applicable to the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-5(f) (1994). The remedies and procedures under the
Civil Rights Act apply; see 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1996) ("The remedies, procedures, and
rights set forth in section 794a of Title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights
this subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity in violation of section 12132 of this title."). According to 29 U.S.C. § 794a, "the
remedies, procedures and rights" available under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are
available to aggrieved persons. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1996).
162. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). In Franklin, the Supreme Court held "that Congress did
not intend to limit the remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX" because
there was a common law presumption that remedies at law and in equity would be
available to enforce rights under federal law, and that in the 1986 Rehabilitation Act
Amendments (which amended Title IX) Congress extended such traditionally estab-
lished remedies to be used in suits against any state, public, or private entity. See id.
at 72.
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V. Effective Local Regulation of the Siting of Group Homes
Although a fairly complex statutory scheme has evolved, in large
part due to liberal interpretation of provisions of the FHAA and
ADA by the courts, significant local discretion in the siting of
group homes still exists. Zoning legislation must be adopted and
local authority should be exercised to effectively regulate the siting
of group homes within this complex scheme.
A. Local Law and Regulation/Disability-based Classifications
1. Dispersion Guidelines
Mandatory dispersion guidelines and rigid spacing requirements
for group homes for the disabled will likely violate the FHAA as
facially discriminatory.'63 New York State's Padavan Law would
likely survive a challenge under the FHAA because of its inherent
flexibility, and lack of rigid spacing requirements. 64
Considering the State legislation in this area, any local law that
attempted to regulate the placement of licensed group homes for
the mentally disabled would be preempted by the Padavan Law.
Furthermore, a local law attempting to place spacing requirements
on the placement of other group homes, would likely be subject to
challenge under the State's Equal Protection Clause and Due Pro-
cess Clause.165
B. Local Law and Regulation/Facially Neutral Standards
1. Definition of Family
To meet the McMinn standard and avoid violating the New York
State Due Process Clause, a municipal ordinance cannot differenti-
ate between related and unrelated individuals when defining "fam-
ily" or other occupancy restrictions for single family zoning
districts. The City of Mount Vernon's "functional equivalency"
standard would likely meet the McMinn test. However, the Town
163. See Horizon House Developmental Serv. Inc. v. Township of Upper South
Hampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993).
164. See Kevin J. Zanner, Dispersion Requirements for the Siting of Group Homes:
Reconciling New York's Padavan Law with the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
44 BuFF. L. REV. 249, 278-81 (1996).
165. For example, singling out a group home for teenaged mothers or a foster care
home for the elderly for special regulation would have to serve a legitimate govern-
ment purpose and the spacing requirement would have to be rationally related to the
government purpose to be served. It is unlikely such a regulation would survive ra-
tional basis analysis. See generally McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544,
488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985).
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of Ossining's standard clearly violates McMinn. By limiting the
number of unrelated persons, the Ossining Zoning Code is both
under-inclusive and over-inclusive.166 Furthermore, the Ossining
Zoning Code may be subject to challenge under the FHAA.167
According to the Second Department, a zoning ordinance that
includes in its definition of family, a rebuttable presumption that
four or more unrelated persons living in a single dwelling does not
constitute the functional equivalent of a traditional family will not
violate the New York State Due Process Clause. 68 As such, if a
local regulation provides a fair opportunity for a party to show that
a proposed group home is the functional equivalent of a single fam-
ily home, such a provision may survive challenge pursuant to the
State Constitution's Due Process Clause. If the presumption is ul-
timately applied to deny approval, however, the municipal decision
making process may be subject to challenge as discriminatory
under the FHAA and ADA.
2. Special Permit
A special permit process for group homes will likely survive
challenge under federal and state laws if the provision does not
single out the handicapped as a class, and if the municipal ordi-
nance includes a definition of family that meets the McMinn stan-
dard. According to the Third Department in Children's Village v.
Holbrook, 169 a special permit provision for group homes is insuffi-
cient if the definition of family in a municipal zoning ordinance was
facially invalid due to the State Due Process Clause. Therefore, a
municipal ordinance would still be flawed if the definition of family
does not meet the McMinn standard. Because the City of Mount
Vernon's definition of family meets the McMinn standard, its spe-
cial permitting requirements would likely survive challenge pursu-
ant to the Third Department's standard.
Special permitting provisions will likely survive challenge under
the FHAA if they are narrowly tailored and are not applied exclu-
sively to group homes for the handicapped. However, certain spe-
cial permit procedures and conditions nevertheless may be
166. According to the Ossining zoning ordinance twenty persons related by blood,
marriage or adoption could reside in a single family home, while six persons function-
ing as a family but not so related would be excluded. See supra note 32 and accompa-
nying text.
167. See infra Part III. and accompanying notes.
168. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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susceptible to FHAA challenge. 7 ' For instance, the notice and
public hearing procedures which are usually included in the special
permit approval process may be subject to challenge under the
FHAA.'7 ' The imposition of special permit conditions concerning
the operations for group homes for the handicapped also may vio-
late the FHAA.172 Moreover, zoning conditions that apply to the
actual operation. of a group home, or place similar restrictions on
group home residents, may exceed delegated local authority to reg-
ulate land-use in New York State. 73
C. Application of Local Land-Use Regulation
In order for a regulation to be challenged as discriminatory,
there must be a protected class. Group home residents from
classes protected under the ADA and FHAA, collectively the
handicapped or disabled, have greater leverage to challenge certain
regulations. Group home residents other than the handicapped,
who are not a protected class under these statutes, may challenge
the local laws and regulations under New York State's Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clauses. Furthermore, the procedures
used to implement and enforce local land-use regulations may be
subject to judicial review pursuant to Article 78 of the New York
State CPLR.
1. Intentional Discrimination
A municipality that has intentionally discriminated against a pro-
tected class in the application of its land-use laws may be subject to
170. See Ass'n for Advancement of the Mentally Handicapped, Inc. v. City of Eliz-
abeth, 876 F. Supp. 614, 621 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding that rigid conditional use permit
conditions for community residences for the developmentally disabled were facially
discriminatory and violated the FHAA when these mandatory conditions were not
related to the city's objective to protect the community from a risk of harm).
171. See Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, Md., 823 F. Supp.
1285, 1296 (D. Md. 1993) (holding that a public notice and hearing requirement rou-
tinely waived for group homes for the elderly, but strictly applied to group homes for
people with disabilities, was discriminatory under the FHAA). The Court also stated
there was no legitimate justification for the public hearing process. See id.
172. See Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1496 (10th Cir. 1995) (ques-
tioning a special permit condition which required that a group home for the mentally
handicapped be: (1) supervised on a twenty-four hour basis; and (2) mandated that a
community advisory council be established to address the concerns of the
community).
173. See generally Dexter v. Town Board of the Town of Gates, 36 N.Y.2d 102, 105,
365 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 324 N.E.2d 870, 871 (1975) (declaring the "fundamental rule
that zoning deals basically with land-use and not with the person who owns or occu-
pies it").
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suit under the FHAA and ADA, as well as the equal protection
and due process clauses. The plaintiff must prove the municipality
was influenced by animus toward the handicapped or other pro-
tected class, or that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor
in the decision making process. It is often difficult to identify the
presence of a discriminatory motive in the municipal decision-mak-
ing process. If a local government offers a non-discriminatory basis
for the application or interpretation of its zoning laws, these local
decisions will likely survive challenge.
A zoning board's record of proceeding should delineate a non-
discriminatory factual basis for its decision. 7 ' Notably, the basis
for the decision must not be the disability of the applicant. A deci-
sion made when strong discriminatory opposition by the commu-
nity is present, may become tainted with discriminatory intent,
because the decision maker may be influenced. However, a rea-
sonable and consistent interpretation of a zoning ordinance will not
be considered proof of discriminatory intent. 75 Accordingly, there
must be justification for a municipal board's interpretation of the
applicable laws and regulations.
In Innovative Health Systems, the Second Circuit concluded that
the zoning board's decision making was suspect because it rejected
the interpretation of its zoning ordinance by its own experts, the
Building Commissioner and Corporation Counsel, without provid-
ing any basis for the rejection. Furthermore, a possible double
standard arose in light of the fact that other uses, similar to the
proposed use, already existed-as conforming within the same zon-
ing district. As such, the Second Circuit concluded that when in-
tentional discrimination is alleged, in addition to reviewing a
government entity's decision making proceedings, courts may also
closely scrutinize interpretation and consistent application of local
laws and regulations by a local government entity to uncover possi-
ble discriminatory taint.
2. Disparate Impact
According to the Arlington Heights test,176 a violation of the
FHAA can be proven if there is a discriminatory effect. In addi-
tion, a violation of the ADA may occur if there is a denial of mean-
174. According to the Second Circuit legitimate safety concerns may be considered
but not "perceived harm from . . . stereotypes and generalized fears." Innovative
Health Sys., 117 F.3d at 49.
175. See Smith & Lee Assoc., 102 F.3d at 792.
176. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
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ingful access to a government service, program, or activity. Once a
plaintiff has made a prima facie case pursuant to the Arlington
Heights factors, a municipality must justify its actions. The munici-
pality must have a legitimate bona fide interest and must have no
alternative which would allow the municipal interest to be served
with less discriminatory impact. 177
3. Reasonable Accommodation
The ADA and FHAA require municipalities to make reasonable
accommodations for the handicapped. In the context of local land-
use decision making, if an accommodation is reasonable, a munici-
pality must not deny a handicapped individual an equal opportu-
nity to enjoy the housing of their choice. 78 For example,
consonant with the factors identified in Smith and Lee Associates, if
a municipality denies a special permit for a group home for handi-
capped residents, to survive a FHAA challenge based on an al-
leged failure to make a reasonable accommodation, a municipality
likely would have to show: (1) the group home would not be a rea-
sonable accommodation because it would impose an undue finan-
cial or administrative burden on the municipality or require
fundamental program changes; (2) the group home is not necessary
because it will in no way enhance the residents' quality of life; or
(3) that the handicapped are not being entirely excluded from resi-
dential neighborhoods, and are not given less of an opportunity to
live in certain neighborhoods than those without handicap. The
municipal burden imposed by the accommodation would then be
balanced against the benefit that the accommodation would pro-
vide to the handicapped group home resident.179 It is important to
note that the reasonable accommodation standard under the
FHAA has not been successful in challenging municipal land-use
regulations and requirements on their face, such as special permit
conditions for group homes.' 80
177. See Karen A. Aviles, Federal Fair Housing Act, 7 Rocky Mountain Land-Use
Institute, at 8-9 (1996).
178. See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
180. For a detailed analysis of the FHAA's reasonable accommodation standard in
the context of group homes for recovering substance abusers, see Laurie C. Malkin,
Troubles at the Doorstep: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Group
Homes for Recovering Substance Abusers, 144 UNIV. OF PA. L. REV. 757, 805-22
(1995); see also United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the plaintiffs, handicapped group home residents, could only bring a
claim under the FHAA after applying for a special permit in conformance with the
Village zoning ordinance procedures).
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Conclusion
Although NIMBY continues to flourish in New York, albeit
somewhat obscured, group home advocates have begun to amass a
significant legal basis to challenge discriminatory zoning laws, and
the exercise of authority that results in exclusion of group homes
from communities. Under the laws of New York State, local gov-
ernments cannot prohibit the placement of group homes that oper-
ate as the functional equivalent to a family, in single family
neighborhoods. Furthermore, the state has also preempted local
regulation concerning the placement of certain licensed group
homes. The FHAA and ADA further limit the ability of local gov-
ernments to regulate the placement and operation of group homes,
and protect the rights of group home residents (those qualifying as
handicapped, disabled, or otherwise protected under the FHAA
and ADA).
Although the ultimate reach of recent federal enactments is un-
clear, the vast protections against discrimination offered by these
statutes continue to be expansively defined by the courts. In con-
sideration of Innovative Health Systems and the federal cases that
have already expanded the reach of the FHAA, local autonomy in
this area of land-use regulation will be closely scrutinized and sub-
ject to challenge under a more complex and ever evolving remedial
scheme. In the interim, the unmet need for group homes for the
mentally disabled and other special needs populations, balanced
against traditional local regulatory interests, will continue to plague
both legislators and the judicial system.
Property, like liberty, though immune under the Constitution
from destruction, is not immune from regulation essential for
the common good. What that regulation shall be every genera-
tion must work out for itself.' 81
181. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS-THE
STORRS LECTURES DELIVERED AT YALE UNIVERSITY 87 (1921).
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